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This paper proves a certainty equivalence result for optimal policy under commitment with
symmetric partial information about the state of the economy in a model with forward-looking
variables. This result is used in our previous paper, "Indicator Variables for Optimal Policy," which
synthesizes what is known about the case of symmetric partial information, and derives useful
general formulas for computation of the optimal policy response coefficients and efficient estimates
of the state of the economy in the context of a fairly general forward-looking rational-expectations
model. In particular, our proof takes into account that, under commitment, the policymaker can
affect the future evolution of the observable variables, and thereby potentially affect the future
information available.
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Monetary policy is inevitably conducted under considerable uncertainty about the state of the
economy and the nature of recent disturbances. Analyses of optimal policy that take no account
of this are therefore of doubtful practical utility. However, in the case of purely backward-
looking models of the kind exclusively used by central banks prior to the 1990s, powerful general
principles for eﬃcient estimation of the state of the economy and for determining the optimal
use to make of such estimates have been well-understood since at least the 1970s. In the case of a
linear economic model, a quadratic loss function for the policymaker, uncertainty only about the
state of the economy (that is, the current values of speciﬁc additive terms in the economic model),
and Gaussian disturbances, a principle of certainty equivalence applies: the optimal policy is the
same as if the state of the economy were fully observable, except that one responds to an eﬃcient
estimate of the state of the economy rather than to its actual value. Moreover, a separation
principle applies, according to which the determination of the optimal response coeﬃcients to
be applied to one’s estimate of the state of the economy (the optimization problem) and the
estimation of the current state of the economy (the estimation or signal-extraction problem)
can be treated as separate problems. The optimal response coeﬃcients are independent of the
speciﬁcation of the central bank’s incomplete information; and the optimal weights to place
on alternative indicators in estimating the state of the economy are independent of the central
bank’s objective function.1
However, the presence of forward-looking variables in the system to be controlled — a com-
mon feature of modern macroeconomic models, including the econometric models now used by
many central banks — complicates matters in a number of respects. For example, optimal policy
under commitment ceases in general to coincide with the outcome of discretionary optimization,
as demonstrated for the general linear model with quadratic objectives in Backus and Driﬃll [1]
and Currie and Levine [3]. Optimal policy under commitment (even in the deterministic case) is
no longer a function solely of the vector of predetermined variables that suﬃces to characterize
the set of possible future paths for the economy from a given date onward; thus one cannot
expect that in the case of partial information optimal policy can depend solely on the optimal
estimate of such a vector of predetermined variables.
Moreover, in the presence of partial information, estimation of the current state of the system
is no longer so simple. For currently observable variables will generally depend not only on the
1 Important early treatments include Chow [2], Kalchbrenner and Tinsley [4], and Leroy and Waud [5].
1current vector of predetermined variables and random observation error with known properties,
but also upon forward-looking variables, the values of which will depend on the private sector’s
expectations about future policy. This makes it far from obvious that a separation principle
should apply, even in a linear-quadratic Gaussian framework. Because the relation between the
unobserved state of the economy and the observable variables depends on expected policy, one
may not be able to solve the optimal ﬁltering problem independently of the solution for the
optimal policy response to the estimated state of the economy.
Nonetheless, analogs of the classical control-theoretic results have been obtained for certain
special kinds of forward-looking models with partial information. With regard to the estima-
tion problem, Pearlman, Currie and Levine [8] have shown in a linear (non-optimizing) model
with forward-looking variables and partial information that the state of the economy can still
be estimated using a Kalman ﬁlter, although the solution is much more complex than in the
purely backward-looking case. Pearlman [7] has used this solution in an optimizing model to
demonstrate that certainty equivalence applies under both discretion and commitment in the
presence of forward-looking variables and symmetric partial information, that is, in the case
that both the central bank and the private sector have access to the same partial information.
In the case of commitment, “certainty equivalence” means that the optimal instrument settings
are the same linear function of the current estimate of the predetermined variables describing
the state of the economy and speciﬁc Lagrange multipliers (related to the value that alterna-
tive expectations would have had in the previous period’s policy problem) as in the case of the
corresponding optimal policy problem under certainty.
Our previous paper [9] synthesizes what is known about the case of symmetric partial in-
formation, and derives useful general formulas for computation of the optimal policy response
coeﬃcients and eﬃcient estimates of the state of the economy in the context of a fairly general
forward-looking (rational-expectations) model. We ﬁnd that not only does certainty equivalence
continue to characterize optimal policy, but that a separation of the problems of optimal policy
and optimal estimation of the current state of the economy continues to be possible, in that the
coeﬃcients of the optimal Kalman ﬁlter are again independent of the central bank’s objective
function.
The proof of certainty equivalence under commitment was not included in [9], in order to
save space. The present paper provides this proof. The proof is for a more general model than
in Pearlman [7] and more intuitive. In particular, our proof explicitly takes into account that,
2under commitment, the policymaker can aﬀect the future evolution of the observable variables,
and thereby potentially aﬀect the future information available.
Section 2 lays out the model, section 3 demonestrates certainty equivalence for the case
of full information, and section 4 proves certainty equivalence for partial information. Section
5 outlines the separation principle, and section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains technical
details regarding the degree to which the policymaker can aﬀect the information revealed by the
observable variables.
2 The model

































where Xt is a vector of nX predetermined variables, xt is a vector of nx forward-looking variables,
it is a vector of the central bank’s ni policy instruments, ut is a vector of nX iid shocks with mean
zero and covariance matrix Σuu, and A1, A2, B and Q are matrices of appropriate dimension.
The nx£nx matrix Q may be singular (this is a slight generalization of usual formulations when
Q is the identity matrix). For any variable zt, z¿jt denotes E[z¿jIt], the rational expectation
(the best estimate) of z¿ given the information It, the information available in period t. The

















5 + Ciit; (2.2)
and let
Lt = Y 0
tWYt (2.3)
be a period loss function, where W is a positive-semideﬁnite weight matrix.

















5 + vt, (2.4)
where vt, the vector of noise, is iid with mean zero and covariance matrix Σvv. The information
It in period t is given by
It = fZ¿;A1;A2;B;C1;C2;Ci;D1;D2;Q;W;±;Σuu;Σvv;¿ · tg, (2.5)
3where ± (0 < ± < 1) is a discount factor. This incorporates the case when some or all of the
predetermined and forward-looking variables are observable.
Note that (2.1) assumes that the expectations xt+1jt in the second block of equations are
conditional on the information It. The case when these expectations are replaced by a private
sector expectations E[xt+1jI
p
t ] where the private-sector information I
p
t diﬀers from It is treated
in Svensson and Woodford [10].
Suppose that the central bank commits itself in an initial ex ante state (prior to the real-
ization of any period zero random variables) to a state-contingent plan for the indeﬁnite future





Here E indicates the expectation with respect to information in the initial state, in which the
commitment is made. It is important to consider optimal commitment from such an ex ante
perspective, because, in the case of partial information, the information that the central bank
possesses in any given state depends upon the way that it has committed itself to behave in
other states that might have occurred instead.
We begin by reviewing the form of the commitment equilibrium under full information, when
Zt includes all elements of Xt and xt. We then turn to the consequences of partial information,
when the information is given by (2.5).
3 Certainty equivalence under full information
Note that in the case of full information, Xtjt = Xt;xtjt = xt; as a result of which it is obvious
that only the aggregated matrices A ´ A1 + A2 and C ´ C1 + C2 matter to the optimization
problem.













t (QEtxt+1 ¡ A21Xt ¡ A22xt ¡ B2it) ¡ ±¡1»0
0(X0 ¡ ¯ X0 ¡ u0);
#
where in each period t, »t and Ξt are vectors of Lagrange multipliers conformable to Xt and xt
respectively, and where Et[¢] ´ E[¢jI
f
t ] denotes expectations conditional on the full information,
I
f
t . The dating of the multipliers indicate the period information with which they are measurable
4(that is, depend on). Thus, the constraint for Xt+1, the predetermined variables, depends on
information available in period t + 1, I
f
t+1, whereas the constraint for QEtxt+1, the forward-
looking variables, depends on the information available in period t, I
f
t . (That is, there is only
one such latter constraint for each information I
f
t , that may be reached in period t, so there is
only one vector of multipliers Ξt for each I
f
t ; in other words, Ξt depends only on the information
available in period t.) The ﬁnal term on the right-hand side corresponds to the constraint
imposed by the vector of initial conditions on X0;
X0 = ¯ X0 + u0; (3.1)
where ¯ X0 is known at the time of commitment.
Using the law of iterated expectations (EEtxt+1 = Ext+1)2, we may equivalently write the
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We have added a term ¡±¡1Ξ0
¡1Qx0 to the right-hand side, for the sake of symmetry in notation,
but now correspondingly stipulate the initial condition
Ξ¡1 = 0: (3.3)
(Note that these Lagrange multipliers do not correspond to any actual constraint upon the
planning problem.) Finally, note that equations (2.2)–(2.3) deﬁne a quadratic function Lt =
L(yt;ytjt;it): Because ytjt = yt in the case of full information, we can here write Lt = L(yt;yt;it):
Thus the Lagrangian (3.2) is a quadratic function of the evolution of the vectors yt and it.






2 More precisely, E[ΞtEtxt+1] = EEt[Ξtxt+1] = E[Ξtxt+1] (where the ﬁrst equality follows since Ξt is measur-





t)B = 0; (3.5)
respectively, where for each of the two arguments z = y;i; Lzt ´ @L(yt;yt;it)=@zt: Recalling the













































































where the Ljk are matrices of constant coeﬃcients (corresponding to the second partial deriva-
tives of L), that depend only upon the matrices C;Ci; and W as above. Using this notation, we
can equivalently write the ﬁrst-order conditions (3.4) – (3.5) as

























5 = 0: (3.8)
Assuming that Lii is of full rank (see Svensson and Woodford [10, appendix B] for a the case
when Lii is not of full rank), we can solve (3.8) for it; obtaining
it = ¡L¡1










Substituting (3.9) into (2.1) and (3.7) to eliminate it, we then obtain a system of equations
for the evolution of yt and (»0
t+1;Ξ0






























































V ´ ¡Lyy + LyiL¡1
ii Liy:
6Here it is worth noting that U and V are symmetric matrices.
Let us assume furthermore that the square matrix on the left-hand side of (3.10) is of full





























We then wish to consider solutions to (3.11) that are consistent with given initial values for
X0 and Ξ¡1 according to (3.1) and (3.3): We note that the number of variables in (3.11) is
2(nX + nx), where nX and nx is the dimension of Xt and xt, respectively, and that there are
nX +nx initial conditions ((3.1) and (3.3)). We shall restrict our attention to bounded solutions,
by which we mean solutions in which for any t; Etyt+¿, Et»t+¿ and EtΞt+¿¡1 satisfy a uniform
bound for all ¿. Such solutions necessarily satisfy the transversality condition for an optimal
plan, and since our equations (2.1)–(2.4) will usually represent only a local approximation to
the true structural equations and true loss function, unbounded solutions need not correspond
at all closely to solutions to the true equations.
As usual (and ignoring non-generic cases), there is a unique bounded solution to (3.11)
consistent with the initial conditions if the number of eigenvalues of M inside the unit circle
(that is, with modulus less than one) is exactly equal to the number of initial conditions, nX+nx.





V ±¡1ˆ I0 ¡ ¸R0
R ¡ ¸ˆ I ¡¸U
3
7
5 = 0: (3.12)
Multiplication of the right blocks of this matrix by ¡¸¡1; then multiplication of the lower blocks
by ¡¸¡1±¡1; and ﬁnally transposition of the matrix does not change the sign of its determinant.





V ±¡1ˆ I0 ¡ ¸¡1±¡1R0




Comparison of this with (3.12) shows that if ¸ is a root, ¸¡1±¡1 must also be. It follows that M
has as many eigenvalues with j¸j > 1 p
± as with j¸j < 1 p
±. Thus, since 1 p
± > 1, at most half of the
3 Even when Q is singular, so that this matrix also is, our conclusions below remain essentially valid. Equation
(3.12) is still the relevant characteristic equation, and again there is a unique bounded solution, in the generic
case, if and only if exactly nX + nx roots are inside the unit circle. Furthermore, it is again true that there are
necessarily no more than this number of such roots, and that for ± close enough to 1, the condition assumed here
almost inevitably holds. However, we omit the algebra for the more general case.
7eigenvalues (that is, at most nX + nx) are inside the unit circle (that is, with j¸j < 1), so there
is no possibility of multiple stationary solutions to (3.11). If ± is close to 1 (as will often be the
case), there are likely to be exactly half inside the unit circle. We shall assume this condition
from now on. Thus (3.11) has a unique bounded solution in which Etyt+¿ and Et(»0
t+1;Ξ0
t)0 can
be expressed as linear functions of the initial conditions X0 and (3.3), for arbitrary ¿ ¸ 0:
In particular, the optimal equilibrium involves evolution of the instrument according to a
relation of the form
it = FXt + ΦΞt¡1; (3.13)
the optimal reaction function in state-space form, where F and Φ are matrices of constant
coeﬃcients. We have just argued that y0 and E0»1 can be expressed as linear functions of X0
and Ξ¡1 ´ 0; substitutions of these solutions into (3.9) then yields (3.13) for t = 0. However,
exactly the same reasoning can be applied to solve equations (3.11) for all ¿ ¸ t; given initial
values Xt and Ξt¡1; and the unique bounded solution will be linear in the initial values, with
exactly the same coeﬃcients in period t = 0. Thus (3.13) must hold for all t.
Similarly, the forward-looking variables evolve according to a relation of the form
xt = GXt + ΓΞt¡1; (3.14)
while the Lagrange multipliers associated with the forward-looking variables evolve according
to
Ξt = SXt + ΣΞt¡1; (3.15)
starting from the initial condition (3.3). Substitution of these equations into (2.1) then implies
that the predetermined state variables evolve according to
Xt+1 = (A11 + A12G + B1F)Xt + (A12Γ + B1Φ)Ξt¡1 + ut+1; (3.16)










the optimal reaction function in integrative form, where F0 ´ F and F¿ ´ ΦΣ¿¡1S, ¿ ¸ 1. Thus
the most fundamental diﬀerence with respect to the discretion case is that under the optimal
8commitment, it (and xt) are no longer a linear function of the current state Xt alone, but instead
depends upon past state vectors Xt¡¿ as well. The inertial character of optimal policy that this
can result in is illustrated in Woodford [11].
Equations (3.13)–(3.16) then completely describe the evolution of the predetermined vari-
ables, the forward-looking variables, and the policy settings it, as a function of the sequence of
realizations of the disturbances ut (and the initial conditions (3.1) and (3.3)). Note that (3.15)
implies that the Lagrange multipliers Ξt are predetermined variables.
Note also that the matrices F;G;S;Φ;Γ;Σ depend on A;B;Q;C;Ci;W and ±; but that
they are independent of Σuu: Thus these coeﬃcients are the same as in the optimal plan under
certainty. This is the certainty equivalence result for the case of full information.
4 Certainty equivalence under partial information
Now suppose instead that both the private sector and the central bank observe only the variables
Zt in period t, that is, have the information It rather than I
f

























22xtjt ¡ B2it) ¡ ±¡1»0
0(X0 ¡ ¯ X0 ¡ u0)
#
:
We now distinguish between zt+1jt ´ E[zt+1 jIt] and Etzt+1 ´ E[zt+1 jI
f
t ], the expectation (of
any variable zt+1) conditional upon all X¿, x¿ and Z¿ for all ¿ · t. Note also that now the
distinction between the two components A1 and A2 is relevant for the problem’s constraints.
Now the multipliers Ãt are measurable with respect to the full period t information, I
f
t , as
the term in brackets represents a constraint that applies in period t: However, they are not
necessarily measurable with respect to It (that is, they do not necessarily depend only on It) as
there is not a single constraint for each information It. Thus, Ãt 6= Ãtjt.
Note also that we do not write explicitly, in the Lagrangian, the constraints indicating the way
in which the choice of stochastic processes for Xt, xt; and it aﬀects the conditioning information
in the various conditional expectations z¿jt, as a result of (2.4). As shown in Appendix A, we
obtain the correct ﬁrst-order conditions even when the additional constraints (discussed there)
are omitted.


























using the law of iterated expectations and introducing Ξt ´ Ãtjt. We can then equivalently



















once again stipulating the initial condition (3.3). It should also be noted that now it must
be measurable with respect to the information It: Note also that Ξt ´ Ãtjt is measurable with
respect to It, even though Ãt is not.
Diﬀerentiation of (4.1) then yields the ﬁrst-order conditions









t)B = 0; (4.3)
where for j = 1;2;i; Ljt denotes the partial derivative of L(yt;ytjt;it) with respect to its ﬁrst,
second, or third argument respectively. Here we have used result (A.14) from appendix A to
diﬀerentiate functions of ytjt with respect to yt. More precisely, condition (4.2) should also
contain a term that is proportional to ¹0
t; the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraint on how changes in the evolution of yt aﬀect the information content of the observables
Z¿ in (2.4), as shown in appendix A. However, as is established there in (A.19), ¹tjt = 0, as a
result of which the neglected term has no consequences for condition (4.4) below, which is all
that matters for our subsequent analysis.
Note that the expectations in (4.2) and (4.3) are not conditioned upon the same information,
because yt may take a diﬀerent value in each state of the world in period t, while it must have
the same value in each state of the world that corresponds to the same information It: (The
consequences of the latter constraint are also treated in the Appendix.) Finally, note that in
the case of full information, conditions (4.2)–(4.3) are identical to (3.7)–(3.8).
As it turns out, only the conditional expectations of these ﬁrst-order conditions with respect
to public information It matter for determination of the optimal evolution of yt and it. Each
term in (4.3) is already conditional upon It: However, taking the conditional expectation of (4.2)
with respect to It; we obtain the simpler expression

































where the matrices Ljk are exactly the same as in (3.6). Thus conditions (4.3) and (4.4) can
alternatively be written








5 = 0; (4.5)

















The pair of diﬀerence equations (4.5) and (4.6) will be observed to be of exactly the same
form as (3.7) and (3.8) in the full-information case, except that conditional expectations are
now with respect to It rather than I
f
t . Thus, exactly in the same way as above, we can obtain
























where the matrix M is the same as in (3.11).
As above (under our assumption about the eigenvalues of M), there is a unique bounded
solution for y¿jt, »¿jt and Ξ¿¡1jt (¿ ¸ t), given any initial values Xtjt and Ξt¡1: Solving (4.5) for
it; we can associate with any such solution to (4.7) a unique bounded solution for i¿jt as well.
This solution satisﬁes
it = FXtjt + ΦΞt¡1; (4.8)
xtjt = GXtjt + ΓΞt¡1; (4.9)
Ξt = SXtjt + ΣΞt¡1; (4.10)
where the matrices F;G;S;Φ;Γ;Σ are the same as in (3.13)–(3.15) for the full-information case.
Equation (4.10) can be integrated to yield Ξt as a distributed lag of past values of Xt¡¿jt¡¿;





11the optimal reaction function in integrated form, where F¿, ¿ ¸ 0, are the same as for the
full-information case. Again, a certain amount of inertia is introduced into the way that Xtjt
determines it (and xt).
Note that equations (4.8)–(4.10) and (4.11) take exactly the same form as (3.13)–(3.15) and
(3.17), once expectations conditional upon I
f
t are replaced by expectations conditional upon It.
This represents an extension of certainty equivalence to the partial-information case.
5 The separation principle
The second row of (2.1) implies that
A1
21(Xt ¡ Xtjt) + A1
22(xt ¡ xtjt) = 0: (5.1)
Assuming that A1
22 is non-singular, this can be solved for xt: Substituting (4.9) for xtjt, one
obtains





G2 ´ G ¡ G1:
Note that the matrices G1 and G2, like the others, are independent of the speciﬁcations of D,
Σuu and Σvv:
Substitution of (4.8), (4.9) and (5.2) into the ﬁrst row of (2.1) furthermore yields
Xt+1 = HXt + JXtjt + ΨΞt¡1 + ut+1; (5.3)









Ψ ´ A12Γ + B1Φ: (5.6)
Equations (4.10) and (5.2)–(5.3) then describe the evolution of the state variables yt in equilib-
rium, once we determine the evolution of the estimates Xtjt of the predetermined variables.
12Substituting (5.2) into (2.4), we obtain
Zt = LXt + MXtjt + ΛΞt¡1 + vt; (5.7)









Λ ´ D2Γ: (5.10)
Equations (5.3) and (5.7) are then the transition and measurement equations for an optimal
ﬁltering problem. Again the transformation into a problem without forward-looking variables
allows us to derive the estimation equations in a manner that is simpler than that used in
Pearlman, Currie and Levine [8].
As demonstrated in more detail in Svensson and Woodford [9], the optimal prediction of Xtjt
is then given by a Kalman ﬁlter,
Xtjt = Xtjt¡1 + K(Zt ¡ LXtjt¡1 ¡ MXtjt ¡ ΛΞt¡1); (5.11)
We can rationalize (5.11) by observing that Zt ¡ MXtjt ¡ ΛΞt¡1 = LXt + vt, hence,
Zt ¡ LXtjt¡1 ¡ MXtjt = L(Xt ¡ Xtjt¡1) + vt;
so (5.11) can be written in the conventional form
Xtjt = Xtjt¡1 + K[L(Xt ¡ Xtjt¡1) + vt]; (5.12)
which allows us to identify K as (one form of) the Kalman gain matrix. From (5.3) we get
Xt+1jt = (H + J)Xtjt + ΨΞt¡1; (5.13)
and the dynamics of the model are given by (4.10), (5.2), (5.3), (5.11) and (5.13).
The Kalman gain matrix is given by
K = PL0(LPL0 + Σvv)¡1; (5.14)
where the matrix P ´ Cov[Xt ¡ Xtjt¡1] is the covariance matrix for the prediction errors Xt ¡
Xtjt¡1 and fulﬁlls
P = H[P ¡ PL0(LPL0 + Σvv)¡1LP]H0 + Σuu: (5.15)
13Thus P can be solved from (5.15), either numerically or analytically, depending upon the com-
plexity of the matrices H, L and Σuu. Then K is given by (5.14). Note that this implies that
the Kalman gain K depends only upon the matrices A;Σuu;D; and Σvv:
6 Conclusions
The above proof demonstrates the certainty-equivalence result that the optimal policy under
commitment given an estimate of the state of the economy is independent of the degree of
uncertainty and hence the same policy as under full information. Furthermore, a separation
principle holds, in that the problem of ﬁnding the optimal policy and the problem of optimally
estimating the current state of the economy can be treated as separate problems (in particular,
the optimal estimation does not depend on the loss function or the reaction function).
These results hold under symmetric partial information about the economy. As demonstrated
in Svensson and Woodford [10], in the asymmetric case in which the policymaker has partial
information and the private sector has full information, the certainty-equivalence result holds
only for the reaction function in state-space form, (4.8), but not for the reaction function in
integrative form, (4.11). Furthermore, the separation principle does not hold, since the optimal
estimation is no longer independent of the loss-function parameters and the reaction function.
A Diﬀerentiation results for conditional expectations
Here we address some technical issues that arise in the characterization of the optimal commit-
ment problem in the case of partial information. These relate to the fact that the policymaker
should recognize that his or her pattern of action aﬀects the statistical relation between the
observables and underlying (exogenous) shocks, and thus might aﬀect the information that is
publicly available about those shocks. This problem can be ignored in the case of discretion
because an independent optimization problem is solved in each state, and we may suppose that
behavior in any single state is of only negligible importance for the correlations that determine
the optimal linear estimates of unobserved states. But we must consider the matter more care-
fully in the case of commitment. In fact, we show here that the results presented in the text,
derived without taking into account the eﬀects of policy upon the content of public information,
continue to be correct.





subject to a series of constraints of the form
M0yt+1 + M1yt+1jt = M2yt + M3ytjt + M4it + ut+1 (A.2)
for each period t ¸ 0, where M0, ..., M4 are matrices of appropriate dimension. Here it is
a vector of control variables chosen in period t, yt is a vector of endogenous state variables
determined by structural equations (A.2), and ut+1 of random disturbances in period t + 1,
assumed independently distributed over time. (For present purposes it is not necessary to
distinguish between the predetermined and non-predetermined elements of yt.) There is also a
set of initial conditions specifying
M0y0 = u0; (A.3)
where u0 is another random vector, distributed independently of the ut+1 vectors for all later
periods.
For any random variable zT; the conditional expectation zTjt denotes
zTjt ´ E[zT jZt;Zt¡1;:::;Z0]; (A.4)
where Zt is a vector of observables in period t, implicitly deﬁned by
Zt = D1yt + D2ytjt + vt; (A.5)
where vt is a vector of additional iid random disturbances. We introduce the notation ¯ ut ´
(u0
t;v0
t)0 for the complete vector of exogenous random disturbances in period t. The controls
must be chosen on the basis of public information, so that
it = itjt (A.6)
is also a constraint.





and making a similar substitution into (A.2). Then substituting (A.4) into (A.7) for the con-
ditional expectations, we obtain an objective that depends upon the state-contingent paths of
15the variables yt;it and Zt: Our problem is then to choose yt, it and, in particular, Zt in each




to constraints (A.2), (A.3), and (A.5), so as to minimize (A.7). This will only determine the
path of itjt, but by then imposing (A.6) as well we can determine the complete evolution of the
control it.










t+1(M0yt+1 + M1yt+1jt ¡ M2yt ¡ M3ytjt ¡ M4itjt ¡ ut+1) (A.8)
¡±¡1E'0




t(Zt ¡ D1yt ¡ D2ytjt ¡ vt); (A.9)
where 't+1; '0; and ¹t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (A.2), (A.3),
and (A.5) respectively. (Thus, 't corresponds to (»0
t;Ã0
t¡1) in the text. There is a separate
vector of multipliers 't+1 for each possible state st+1 ´ (¯ u0
t+1; ¯ u0
t;:::; ¯ u0
0)0, a separate '0 for
each possible s0 ´ ¯ u0; and a separate ¹t for each possible state st. The expectation operator
E[¢] indicates unconditional expectations (expectations in the ex ante state in which the optimal
commitment is chosen). The commitment is chosen prior to the realization of any period 0
states, as the systematic pattern of behavior committed to in period 0 aﬀects the information
revealed in alternative states in that period, as in others. The aim of this appendix is to explain
the calculation of the partial derivatives of such a Lagrangian with respect to the random paths
speciﬁed for yt, it and Zt:
A.1 Properties of the conditional expectation zTjt
We ﬁrst note, that the conditional expectation (A.4) is a linear operator of the form
zTjt(st) ´ EsT[Pt;T(st;sT)zT(sT)]; (A.10)
where Pt;T(st;sT) is a (scalar) kernel. Here sT ´ (¯ u0
T;:::; ¯ u0
0)0 is an arbitrary state in period
T, st is an arbitrary state in period t · T; and EsT denotes the expectation over the possible
states sT, under the ex ante or unconditional probability measure. (Note that EsT[¢] should not
be confused with Et[¢] ´ E[¢jI
f
t ], the expectation conditional on the full information in period
t, I
f
t .) Under our assumption of normally distributed disturbances, the conditional expectation
16is simply a linear projection upon the observables. This means that the stochastic kernel takes
the form
Pt;T(st;sT) = Pt;t(st;sT;t);
where sT;t is the predecessor of state sT in period t (that is, the part of the history that has oc-




Furthermore, Pt;t can be expressed in the standard form for linear projections,
Pt;t(s1
t;s2
t) = ˆ Z0
t(s2





t are two states in period t and ˆ Zt(st) is a vector of observables in period t and
earlier (including a constant) that results under st and spans the entire public information space
in period t; but that includes no redundant variables (so that the matrix E[ ˆ Zt ˆ Z0
t] is non-singular).
(Note that if s1
t and s2











The choice of a particular representation ˆ Zt need not concern us here. We do, however, wish
to observe certain consequences of the general form (A.11) for the stochastic kernel. One is that






Another is that, for each ﬁxed state s2
t; the random variable Pt;t(¢;s2
t) is a linear combination
of the vector of observables as of period t; so that Pt;t(¢;s2
t) is in the linear space spanned by
the vector of observables in period t. More generally, for any period T ¸ t and any state sT in
period T, Pt;T(¢;sT) is a random variable that is measurable with respect to the information It.
These properties of the kernel suﬃce for the calculations that we need to do here.
A.2 Diﬀerentiation of expressions involving conditional expectations
We now consider diﬀerentiation of expressions involving conditional expectations, of the sort that
appear in the Lagrangian (A.9). We ﬁrst consider the eﬀect upon an expression of the form zTjt
of varying the state-contingent path of random variable zT, holding ﬁxed the state-contingent
paths of the variables (Zt;:::;Z0), and hence keeping the stochastic kernel Pt;T unchanged.
Suppose we let
zT = ¯ zT + ÁºT; (A.13)
17where ¯ zT is the value of the random variable at which we wish to evaluate the partial derivative,
Á is a scalar constant, and ºT is another random variable (that is, another function of the state
in period T, sT) indicating the direction in which we wish to vary zT: Then we deﬁne the partial
derivative of a functional g(zT) with respect to perturbations of the random variable zT as the









in the case of any perturbation of the form (A.13), that is, for any random variable ºT in period
T.
From (A.10), we then can observe that
@zTjt(st)
@zT
(sT) = Pt;T(st;sT); (A.14)
where st is any state in period t · T. By substituting (A.13) into (A.10), diﬀerentiating with







= EsT[Pt;T(st;sT)ºT(sT)] = ºTjt(st): (A.15)
Note that (A.15) is just the conditional expectation with respect to It of the expression that
would be obtained if one were diﬀerentiating zT instead of zTjt. This is intuitive since, by the
law of iterated expectations,
E[zTjtºT] = E[zTjtºTjt] = E[zTºTjt]:
Thus the partial derivatives of each of these equivalent expressions with respect to zT should be
the same; but the partial derivative of the ﬁnal expression is obviously ºTjt:
A.3 The eﬀect of variation in the dependence of Zt on the state st
We turn next to the eﬀect upon conditional expectations of variation in the way that the variables
Zt depend upon the state st ´ (¯ u0
t;:::; ¯ u0
0)0. We consider the eﬀect of variation in a particular
(scalar) random observable Zjt (for a given j, 1 · j · nZ) in the information I¿ for some ¿ ¸ t.
By analogy with (A.13), we consider perturbations of the form
Zjt = ¯ Zjt + Á³t
around the random observable ¯ Zjt for any random variable ³t. We wish to consider the eﬀect of
variation in Á on a conditional expectation zTj¿. We shall assume that our baseline pattern of
18variation in the observables ¯ Zt is such that no small perturbation changes the dimension of the
linear space spanned by the observables; that is, we assume that we are not in a degenerate case
in which ¯ Zjt is an exact linear combination of other observables, but would cease to be under
an inﬁnitesimal perturbation. This is necessary in order for a partial derivative of a conditional
expectation with respect to Zjt to exist. Our assumption means that the ﬁrst-order conditions
that we derive here are necessary conditions for an optimal commitment under the assumption
that optimal policy does not involve a degeneracy of this kind. (It does not seem to us likely
that it should, in general; but here we must simply note that our methods apply only to the
case in which it does not.)
Now, under the above observation, one observes that for any ³t in the linear space spanned
by the observables ¯ Zt in period t, the linear space spanned by ¯ Zlt, l 6= j and Zjt = ¯ Zjt + Á³t










This is true in particular for ³t equal to the kernel Pt;t(st; ˜ st); where st is a ﬁxed arbitrary state





(˜ st)Pt;t(st; ˜ st)
#
= 0: (A.16)
This property of the partial derivative with respect to Zjt suﬃces for our purposes. It means
that as long as we are only interested in the expectation of our ﬁrst-order conditions conditional
upon public information, we can ignore the eﬀects upon conditional expectations of variations in
the way that observables depend upon the history of realizations. This in turn makes constraint
(A.5) irrelevant to the optimization problem. We now show this explicitly by turning to the
ﬁrst-order conditions associated with our problem.
Diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian (A.9) with respect to it(st), and using (A.14) together with
(A.12), we obtain the ﬁrst-order condition
E˜ stPt;t(st; ˜ st)[Lit(˜ st) + '0
t+1(˜ st)M4] = 0;
where Lit(st) ´ Li[yt(st);ytjt(st);itjt(st)]: This can equivalently be written
Litjt + '0
t+1jtM4 = 0: (A.17)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to yt(st); we obtain the corresponding ﬁrst-order condition






tjtD2 = 0: (A.18)
19Condition (A.18) holds for any possible history in any period t ¸ 0, but for t = 0 we set
'0j¡1 = 0, so the term ±¡1'0
0j¡1M1 is deleted.























where for each period ¿ ¸ t; s¿ indexes an arbitrary state in that period. But taking the



























(˜ st)Pt;t(st; ˜ st)
#)
= 0; (A.19)
where we use (A.16) to evaluate each term in large square brackets. Then the conditional
expectation of (A.18) with respect to It is given simply by
L1tjt + L2tjt + '0
t+1jt(M2 + M3) ¡ ±¡1'0
tjtM0 ¡ ±¡1'0
tjt¡1M1 = 0; (A.20)
for t ¸ 0, using (A.19). (Here, we let '0j¡1 = 0.)







the ﬁrst-order conditions (A.17) and (A.20) suﬃce, along with the structural equations (A.2),
to completely determine the expected dynamics y¿jt, '¿jt for all ¿ ¸ t; given initial conditions
for period t. These results suﬃce, in turn, to completely determine the optimal evolution of
the state vector yt and the optimal actions it, as a function of the history of realizations of the
exogenous disturbances. Hence, only ¹tjt (which is always zero) matters for our purposes, rather
than ¹t itself. Consequently, the relevant ﬁrst-order conditions, (A.17) and (A.20), are the same
as if we simply neglected the constraints implied by (A.5) in computing the optimal plan.
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